BRITISH GLIDING ASSOCIATION

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

TECHNICAL NEWSHEET

TNS 7/8/95

PART 1 Airworthiness "AGGRO". Please add to the 1995 Blue Pages.

1.1 T-21 Sedburgh - Elevator disconnected in flight - the attached was mailed to owners 14/7/95 for action as detailed therein, the rod end separated from the bearing housing on the cockpit push-pull rod.

1.2 L'Hotellier Connector not secured on Cirrus Aileron Control. The attached LBA Airworthiness Directive is classified as "MANDATORY". (First published n BGA TNS 3/4/94!)

BGA inspectors must check on C of A renewal inspections that L'Hotellier locking devices can be applied. In the above Cirrus incident, the locking pins could not be inserted when the connector was correctly assembled. Thereafter, it is the responsibility of the operator to ensure correct assembly of his glider in all respects. Duplicate inspections by competent persons should be encouraged and entered in the DI book.

1.3 L'Hotellier, Standard Cirrus. Undemanded asymmetric speed-brake deployment. A second incident to the same glider was remedied by re-adjusting the control rods to provide firm tension on each speed-brake cap. Safety clips had not been fitted. (Reported by Thomas Gornal I/C/439).

1.4 Puchacz - Wheel Bolt Failures - recommend replacement with steel bolts. (R K Warren, Derby & Lancs GC).

1.5 Parachutes de France. AD/95 - 131 (AB) herewith may effect some operators of French parachutes?

1.6 Aft Tow Hook Installations must be installed to BGA approved modification schemes, which achieve the equivalent strength (or better) of original installation. Some modifications have not achieved this standard and all must be inspected a.s.a.p. (Drawing for OLY 2 is available from Martin Carolan - 01452 741463).

1.7 Fournier RF3. Latest issue of CAA A/Ds Vol 3 is attached.

1.8 Bocian 1E. Cracks found at wheel box frame No 11 on two Bocians. (Reported by R F Hayes, Mendip GC). Sketch herewith.

1.9 LS-6 Water Ballast bags should be double skinned contrary to advice in TNS 3/4/95.

1.10 K-13. Unsecured Ballast bar restricted the elevator control in flight. (Reported by Bristol & Glos GC).

1.11 Super Dimona (HOAC 36R) Exhaust system corrosion leading to failure, has been reported to FAA/USA by Austrian Airworthiness Authority.

1.11 Stemme 10. LBA A/D 273 (herewith) restricts fuel options to AVGAS only. (Believed to be associated with sticking inlet valves?)

PART 2 GENERAL MATTERS

2.1 Civil Registered Sailplanes (Tugs, SLMG's etc). Incidents and Accidents must be reported to the Air Accident Investigation Branch 0171 276 6000 (24 hours line).

2.2 CAA C of A Renewals. CAA form 202L has been replaced by a simplified form 202NR (sample herewith and copies available from BGA office or CAA direct).

2.3 CAA C of A Renewals (after 3 years!!) should be initiated and processed 62 days before their expiry. Why wait to the last day and then have to wait 3 weeks for renewal?

2.4 T-21 Sedburgh types are becoming and endangered species. Any ideas? Try foam filling??

2.5 Famous Last Words

L/Hotellier control system connectors require special attention by BGA Inspectors and by glider pilots! AD 94-001 is classified by LBA as "MANDATORY".

R B Stratton
Chief Technical Officer

BGA TNS 7/8/95 To: All T21 Owners

Slingsby T21 SEDBERGH Gliders

T. 21

Immediate Inspection of Elevator Control System

An in-flight disconnection of the elevator system has been identified as a failure of Rod Elevator Push-Pull in the cockpit (Port No 21B -2- 24/D), at the ball-end connection. There is evidence of corrosion, lack of lubrication, and possible pre-failure fracture, due to seizure.

The final drive to the elevator (Rod Elevator Push-Pull Port No 21B - 2- 24/C), should also be inspected for signs of corrosion and deterioration.

Record this inspection in the log book and repeat annually.

Dick Stratton
Chief Technical Officer

T 21 SEDBERGH. ELEVATOR Push Failure. 12/7



THESE FRACTURES FOUND ON D. L OF GLIDERS BY MENDIP GLIDING CLUB



FRACTURE LONG PORT AND STBD SIDE ON BOCIAN IE BGA No. 1804 AND PORT SIDE ONLY ON BOCIAN IE BGA. No 3529

BOCIAN IE BGA NO. 1804 FRACTURES PORT AND STBD. SIDES.

HRS. FLOWN 2184.34
LAUNCHES 8144

BOCIAN IE BGA. No 3529 FRACTURE PORT SIDE ONLY.

HRS. FLOWN 2446.38
LAUNCHES 11241

R.F. Hayes.
1/A/149 ME
10/6/95

SHEET 1 OF 1

cc. D' Stratten!

Luftfahrt-Bundesamt
-AD-Department-

Airworthiness Directive

In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the German original issue

93-001/12 L'Hotellier MANDATORY Date of issue: April 20, 1994

Affected aeronautical equipment:
L'Hotellier ball and swivel joints

- all sailplanes and powered sailplanes equipped with l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints with lock plates.

Subject:
Inspection and Modification of l'Hotellier quick release attachment

Reason:
Reported incidents involving l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints have prompted the LBA to have investigations made as to the operational safety of l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints.

The results have shown that the friction surfaces of the lock plates will be run in and smoothened after a relatively small number of operations. As has been demonstrated in the tests, in this case even normal operating conditions are sufficient under unfavourable circumstances to surmount the static friction (i.e. the lock plates open).

The reason for this AD is a new issue of the L'Hotellier Maintenance Instruction.

Action and compliance:

Compliance: following actions must be accomplished not later than March 31, 1993

The ball and swivel joints with lock plates must be secured. For this purpose, the following actions are to be accomplished:

1) If the joints are not yet equipped with safety pins (e.g. l'H 140-31 made by Hotellier), these safety pins have to be retrofitted. In certain cases it may become necessary to rebore the hole in the lock plate, which is provided for visual inspection, to ø 1.2 mm so that the safety pin can be inserted (see figure 1).



figure 1

b) If older Flight Manuals do not contain information on l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints, the following paragraph (probably on a new page) is to be included in the Flight Manual under the Section "Rigging", if the l'Hotellier joint is or is to be secured by means of a safety pin:

Hotellier Ball and Swivel Joints

Prior to installation everyone should familiarize with the functioning of Hotellier ball and swivel joints.

The swivel is to be slid completely over the ball with the lock plate pressed down. During locking the lock plate moves back slightly so that in a correct joint the hole on the narrow edge of the lock plate becomes visible.

The safety pin is to be inserted in this hole thus securing the ball and swivel joint.



Warning:
Unsecured ball and swivel joints may open automatically in flight.

These entries in the Flight Manual can be made in writing or as a copy indicating the AD-No. 93-001.

Entry in the list of effective pages is to be made indicating the AD-No. 93-001.

3) Maintenance Manual
The enclosed Instructions for Maintenance (l'Hotellier, issue E 03/94) becom herewith part of the operating instructions and are to be included in the Maintenance Manual for the sailplane or powered sailplane - as far as this has not been done already by the manufacturer of the sailplane or powered sailplane concerned.

4) All l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints are to be inspected in accordance with the above Instructions for Maintenance. Joints exceeding the allowable tolerances ar to be replaced.

Luftfahrt-Bundesamt
-AD-Department-

Airworthiness Directive

In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the German original issue

TNS 4/94
Repeated: TNS 7/8/95

94-001 L'Hotellier MANDATORY

Date of issue: 03.02.1994

Affected aeronautical equipment:
L'Hotellier ball and swivel joints with locking cams (-Type 45 -/ Ratchet)

- all sailplanes and powered sailplanes equipped with L'Hotellier ball and swivel joints with locking cams.

Subject:
Inspection and Modification of L'Hotellier quick release attachment

Reason:
New evaluations of reported incidents involving L'Hotellier ball and swivel joints with locking cams have prompted the LBA to have these joints as well incorporated into the investigations as to the operational safety of l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints.

The results are similar to those obtained with the ball and swivel joints with lock plates.

As has been demonstrated in the tests, even normal operating conditions are sufficient under unfavourable circumstances to surmount the static friction (i.e. even the locking cams may open).

Action and compliance:

Compliance: following actions must be accomplished not later than April 30, 1994

The ball and swivel joints with locking cams must be secured. For this purpose, the following actions are to be accomplished:

1) Safety pins (e.g. L'H 140-31 made by Hotellier) have to be retrofitted. In case the locking cams have not already been fitted with holes (Ø 1,3 mm) these holes are to be drilled within the framework of this AD.

   Insertion of a safety pin is not applicable for l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints which are already equipped with other approved locking systems (e.g. Uerlings sleeve), or if such systems are newly installed.

   Uerlings sleeves (specification number SE-001/78) can only be installed for straight joints and transmissions, but cannot be used for 90° joints.

2) Flight Manual

a) Section "Rigging"

The recommendation in several Flight Manuals: the lock plate of l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints "should be secured"... given in this or in a simular form is to be deleted and to be replaced by the following sentence:

"The L'Hotellier ball and swivel joint must be secured."

b) If older Flight Manuals do not contain information on l'Hotellier ball and swivel joints, the following paragraph (probably on a new page) is to be included in the Flight Manual under the Section "Rigging", if the Hotellier joint is or is to be secured by means of a safety pin:

Hotellier Ball and Swivel Joints

Prior to installation everyone should familiarize with the functioning of L'Hotellier ball and swivel joints.

The swivel is to be slid completely over the ball on the rod with the locking cam pulled back. During locking the locking cam moves back slightly so that in a correct joint the hole on the averted edge of the locking cam becomes visible.

The safety pin is to be inserted in this hole thus securing the ball and swivel joint.



Warning !

Unsecured ball and swivel joints may open automatically in flight !

These entries in the Flight Manual can be made in writing or as a copy indicating this AD-No.: 94-001.

An entry in the list of effective pages or an update of the amendment no. is to be made indicating the AD-No.: 94-001, if such a list exists.

Information:
Type-related technical information already published by the manufacturer or by the product support organisation for L'Hotellier ball and swivel joints become part of this AD.

Working Instruction for Action 1:

For fitting the hole proceed as follows:
Drill the hole Ø 1,3 mm with the ball correctly inserted so that one edge of the hole is level with the main body of the joint and on the other side at least 1,5 mm of material is left (see also the following sketch).



Warning: When working on the joint please see to it that no borings get in between the ball and the socket.

The safety pins are available from:

- L'Hotellier: safety pin reference No. L'H 140-31
- manufacturers or product support organisations for the sailplane or powered sailplane types concerned
- others: safety pin Ø 1,2 mm
  Ford reference No. 1473 931 (worldwide)

Accomplishment and log book entry:
Actions under No's.: 1 and 2 may be accomplished by a competent person or by an approved service station and to be checked and entered in the log by a licensed inspector.

Luftfahrt-Bundesamt
-AD-Department-

Airworthiness Directive

In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the German original issue

95-273 STEMME

Date of issue: Juli 11, 1995

Affected powered sailplanes:
German Type Certificate No.: 846
Stemme
S10 - Serial numbers: 10-12 to 10-60
S10-V - Serial numbers: 14-002 to 14-022 and transformed A/C 14-012M to 14-060M

Subject:
Change the flight manual with text: The aircrafts are to be fuelled with Fuel AVGAS 100 LL only.
Inspection of the fine fuel filters.
Inspection of the engine.

Reason:
Deposits in the in induction manifold.

Actions:
Change the flight manual in accordance with
Stemme Service Bulletin A31-10-021 Amdt.-Index 01c, dated Juli 28.06.1995.
Inspections in accordance with
Stemme Service Bulletin A31-10-021 Amdt.-Index 01c and
with Limbach Service Bulletin N° 47.

Compliance:
Change the flight manual befor the next flight.
Inspections must be carried out on all engines befor the next flight.

Technical publication of the manufacturer:
Stemme Service Bulletin No. A31-10-021 Amendment-Index 01c, dated Juni 28. 1995
Limbach Service Bulletin No. 47, dated Juni 28. 1995,
which becomes herewith part of this AD and may be obtained from Messrs.

Stemme GmbH & Co. KG
Gustav-Meyer-Allee 25

D-13355 Berlin
Federal Republic of Germany

Accomplishment and log book entry:
Action to be accomplished by an approved service station and to be checked and entered in the log by a licensed inspector.

* * *

GSAC

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

released by DIRECTION GENERALE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE

Inspection and/or modifications described below are mandatory. No person may operate a product to which this Airworthiness Directive applies except in accordance with the requirements of this Airworthiness Directive

Translation of 'Consigne de Navigabilité'
ref.: 95-131(AB)
In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the French original issue.

PARACHUTES DE FRANCE

Emergency parachute

"French" connector links tightening

This Airworthiness Directive applies to the emergency parachutes PARACHUTES DE FRANCE P512()01 delivered within the 12 last months and which numbers are following :

DE039 to DE046 DF001 to DF024 DG001 to DG017 DH001 to DH006
DJ001 to DJ019 DM001 to DM025 EC001 to EC031 ED001 to ED025
EE001 to EE019.

During a maintenance periodical check on one parachute it was found out that the connector links were not completely screwed and tightened.

The following measures are rendered mandatory at the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive :

- Before next use, verify tightening of the 4 "French" connector links between canopy and harness container. Write down the re-packing into the parachute log-book with mention «French links tightened».

Ref. : ASB P512-25-002 PARACHUTES DE FRANCE

EFFECTIVE DATE :

Upon receipt after JUNE 21, 1995

v/JPD

TNS 7/8/95

Issue 10
June 1995

FOURNIER RF3 SERIES MOTOR GLIDERS AND FOURNIER RF6 SERIES AIRCRAFT

PART 1 – DIRECTION GENERALE DE L'AVIATION CIVILE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

DGAC AD No.	*Description*	*Applicability – Compliance – Requirement*
64–20	Airworthiness Data Sheet restrictions.	Applicable to RF3 Series aircraft. Compliance is required as detailed in AD.
67–39–1	Wing Skin – Inspection for cracks and deterioration of glued joints.	Applicable to all RF3 Series aircraft. INSPECT the critical zone every 30 flight hours until modified in accordance with Service Bulletin Alpavia No 2.
79–234	Fuselage – Modification to the fireproof bulkhead – Inspection of a seal supporting plate.	Applicable to all RF6B–100 aircraft. Compliance required as detailed in AD. Fournier Aviation Service Bulletin No 3 also refers.
79–235	Flight Controls – Inspection and replacement of aileron control coupling rod.	Applicable to all RF6B–100 aircraft. Compliance required as detailed in AD. Fournier Aviation Service Bulletin No 2 also refers.
86–031 R1	Structure and Flight Controls – Inspection for corrosion of metal parts.	Applicable to all RF6B–100 and RF6B–120 aircraft. Compliance required as detailed in AD. Fournier circular dated 10.01.1986 also refers.
75–76	Operating Limitations – Normal category certification only.	Applicable to all RF3 Series aircraft. Install a plate in the cockpit on the wheel well with the following notice no later than 15 May 1975: U category operation and spins prohibited.

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

Safety Regulation Group

SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR THE RENEWAL OF A CERTIFICATE OF AIRWORTHINESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH BCAR A/B 3–4.

DISTRIBUTION: **White** – CAA **Pink** – CAA **Blue** – Approved Organisation

1 AIRCRAFT DETAILS (For S.L.M.G's).

Registration	Type	Serial No	Category

Total hours flown since manufacture to 31 December prior to this renewal ..... associated flight cycles/landings* N/A

Type of Engine: Type of Propeller: ~~APU Type:~~

The current Aircraft Weight and Centre of Gravity Schedule dated ..... accurately reflects the present weight of the aircraft.

The aircraft was last weighed on .....

Flight Manual/POH/Owners Manual* amendment status report dated.....

Aircraft tested to ~~AP5~~ BCA No: Issue No: Date of Test:

The aircraft has been flight tested in accordance with the agreed Fleet Test Programme ~~YES~~/NO*

2 COMPLIANCE STATEMENT

I confirm that compliance with the following is properly entered and certified in the aircraft technical records:-

Airworthiness Notices, Contents Issue: (latest Issue!).

Mandatory Aircraft Modifications and Inspections Summary, Contents and Check List of Pages, Issue: } BCA 1995 Compendium + latest TNs.

FAA Summary of Airworthiness Directives Large Aircraft/Small Aircraft and Rotorcraft at bi-weekly listing No:

Foreign Airworthiness Directives Vols I and II - CAA Additional Airworthiness Directives, Contents and List of Pages, Issue:

Foreign Airworthiness Directives Vol III Contents and Check List of Pages, Issue:

Scheduled Maintenance and Component Life Limits satisfactory: ~~YES~~/NO* Schedule ref. MS:

All modifications and repairs revealed during this inspection and carried out since last C of A renewal have been assessed and are adequately recorded and certified in the appropriate Log Books.

~~The last Maintenance Review is dated~~

Radio equipment in accordance with AC968NR YES/NO*

3 CERTIFICATION

Certified that the appropriate requirements of BCAR, Section A/B Chapter A/B 3–4 have been complied with and the particulars contained herein are correct.
It is recommended that the Certificate of Airworthiness be renewed for a period of 36 months, in the following category: ~~Transport Category (Passenger)/ Transport Category (Cargo)/Aerial Work~~/Private/~~Special~~*

Organisation: BCA.

Company Approval No: DAI/8378/T3

Signature CTO. Date

Name in block capitals:

(for CAA use only)

The previous Certificate of Airworthiness has been replaced by Certificate No:
which is effective as follows:

DATE OF VALIDITY: .....

DATE OF EXPIRY: .....

Surveyor's/Administrator's Name:

Signature:

Date of Issue: Regional Office:

The following documents are attached: Flight Test Report/Flight Manual Status Report/Weight and C of G Schedule/Previous C of A

SAFETY FLASH

LAUNCH FAILURES & CABLE BREAKS

Three people have died this season because they turned at low level. **In each case the glider spun**. One accident was after an abandoned aerotow because an aileron was disconnected.

It is widely accepted that a final turn should be completed by 250 ft. On some occasions at restricted sites and after a cable break it may be necessary to make a lower final turn but in doing so the risk is considerable.

It is also a fact that below a certain height recovery from a spin is impossible; the critical height depends, to some extent, on the type of glider but for all types is several hundred feet.

Why expose yourself to the high workload of a low-level circuit from a cable break at a height below which you would normally have completed a final turn? The possible accident from going straight ahead after a cable break, even if there isn't quite enough room ahead, is unlikely to be anything like as serious as spinning in.

Pilots are not asking themselves the right questions:

- the first is **"can I land straight ahead?"** and not *"can I get round?"*

Saving time and expediting the retrieve may have **DEATH** as the penalty. Such factors must not influence the decision. **Land straight ahead whenever possible**; only make small changes of direction to take advantage of the airfield shape (if this applies).

Recognise that if you have had to turn on more occasions than you have landed straight ahead then you may be strongly disposed to turn, almost as a reflex.

Instructors should teach straight-ahead landings from cable breaks **before** teaching any situations which involve turning. A student or pilot being tested who turns when the straight-ahead option is possibleshould have further training or fail the test as appropriate.

Turning low down is dangerous for your health!

BGA

July 1995