# BGA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

## TECHNICAL NEWSHEET 5/6/99

PART 1 AIRWORTHINESS "AGGRO" Please consult the BGA 1999 Red Pages .

1.1. TOST HOOK FAILURE. Sketch from London Sailplanes illustrates failure of the operating lever on a KA21. (Overhauled Hook).

1.2. STANDARD AUSTRIA Loss of Rudder Control as illustrated in report and sketch from Burn G.C.

1.3. ASTIR'S - Sealing tape becoming detached, seriously impairs the performance of the flying controls. Applies to all types of gliders.

1.4. LS-6 Aileron not Connected - Positive Control checks are no substitute for inspection to establish proper connection. Reported by Bidford G.C.

1.5. SCHLEICHER KA6, KA7, KA8 etc. Front tailplane mounting bolts may have become very loose. Replace if necessary. Reported by J.A. Turney I/C/685E.

1.6. ASW20L - Elevator not connected. Once again "positive checks" failed to establish that the connector was NOT properly connected! (Reported by Deeside G.C.).

1.7. WASSAMER WA28F. Drag Pin handle incorrectly assembled, and therefore insecure. Sketch by G.M. Johnson I/C/1134/ME.

1.8. IAR-SA BRASOV - latest list of A/D's for IS.28M2's dated March 99 - herewith.

1.9. VEGA. SLINGSBY T.I. 110/T65 requires inspection for cracks of the Fin Mounted Tailplane attachment bushes. (WITHIN 6 MONTHS).

1.10. IS 28B2 / IS 28M2 and IS 30. Inspect Airbrake Handle for cracks. GFA A/D 493 refers.

1.11. NIMBUS 3 (TURBO). Roll-Control was impaired when wheel was retracted, because the Vario Bottle had fallen into the controls. (Reported by David Strange).

1.12. DG800A & 800B. LBA A/D 1999-167 requires ENGINE and revision of manual pages (attached).

1.13. SLICK MAGNETO / COUPLING FAILURE. FAA A/D 99-04-04 involves Lycoming 0-540 engines.

1.14. ME7 (8) ELEVATOR CONTROL lost when operating lever at the base of the fin became detached due to poor manufacturing standards. Immediate inspection is recommended. Owners informed.

PART TWO GENERAL MATTERS

2.1. WEIGHING OF GLIDERS Note from Tim Macfadyen gives good advice.

2.2. ALTIMETER Sub-Scale Settings (QFE). Must be checked at CofA renewal., as a simple means of checking altimeter serviceability. (Max Error 2 MB's/60ft. Ref TNS 4/98)/

2.3. MAJOR REPAIRS must be in accordance with Manufacturers Repair Scheme, a Standard Repair Scheme, or to a major modification repair scheme approved by the manufacturer or the BGA. (Section 7.7. of the BGA Technical Procedure Manual refers).

2.4. AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES issued by Foreign Airworthiness Authorities, have no legal status in any other country, unless they are formally "adopted" by that country. Nevertheless it is wise to take note of the airworthiness implications of any such A/D's. In respect of A/D's applicable to gliders, negotiation on their application may be possible, once the risk has been assessed.

2.5. CAA LETTER To OPERATORS No. 1878, introduces Light Aircraft Maintenance Schedule (1999) issue. (CAA Airworthiness Notice 63 also refers). Becomes effective June 1st 1999. Therefore, all Annuals and Star Annuals must be implemented to Issue 1999 and the CAA FORM 202L endorsed accordingly.

Proforma Worksheets are available from the BGA office. LAMS 99 Schedules will be sent to Registered Owners by Westward Digital, 37 Windsor Street, Cheltenham, Glos, GL52 2DG (from whom additional copies can be obtained).

Dick Stratton
Chief Technical Officer

TNS 5/6/99.


# London Sailplanes Limited

Tring Road, Dunstable, Bedfordshire LU6 2JP
Telephone: (01582) 662068
Fax: (01582) 606568
E-mail: info@gliding.powernet.co.uk
Web: http://www.powernet.co.uk/gliding/

Workshops/Stores/Technical Enquiries


8/4/99

TO THE BGA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

HOOK REMOVED FROM A K21

OVERHAULED HOOK FITTED ON THE 12/5/98

YOURS GEORGE JACKSON



# INCIDENT REPORT

STJ - AUSTRIA
TNS 5/6/99

ATE Of Occurrence 4th. April 1999. Time Approx 1130 UTC.
PLACE Local Soaring within 5 nm Burn Airfield at a height of approx 2500 feet AAL.
PILOT John Parr age 38 with approx. 65 hours solo time, approx 20 hours on type.
AIRCRAFT Standard Austria BGA No. 2166 Built 1963.
WEATHER Clear 5/8 @4500ft. Wind 180/10.

INCIDENT
Whilst thermalling normally, both rudder pedals moved forward, and the pilot was aware of NO rudder command. Aileron and "elevator" responses were as normal.
He picked a field and with as little turning as possible made a successful and damage free landing.

INVESTIGATIONS
The retrieve crew observed when derigging the glider that the rudder cable was detached from the rudder bar at the control "mixer box"

Upon return to the airfield, Bob Collins (Inspector IA 120 ME) and myself inspected the controls and deduced the following correct method of assembly:-
Each rudder pedal is attached to the "mixer box" located behind and below the spar position on this "V" tail glider by a cable passing down the sides of the craft, round pulleys, through an oval section steel tube (approx 100 mm. in length) {this acts as rudder stops against a frame} terminating round a thimble with a ferrule. A 50 mm. long steel plate (which is an anchor point for a bungee rope) has an 8mm O.D. spacer tube approx 20mm long riveted to it .The cable and thimble are inserted almost completely through the oval sleeve. The spacer passes through slot holes in the oval tube and the thimble, and lies between the cheeks of a bracket at each end of the rudder bar which is part of the mixer box. An M6 bolt passes through the bracket and spacer tube being held by a "Nyloc" nut.
Near the end of the oval tube remote from the oval holes, approx half way up is a 1.5mm split pin, which stops the tube oscillating up and down on the cable.
In this instance the stbd. cable was loose from the oval tube, but the spacer and nut and bolt were still in place, as were the thimble and ferrule on the cable. There was however no 1.5mm split pin. Upon examining the port side assembly, Mr. Collins removed the split pin which instantly released the cable complete with thimble and ferrule. It appeared that the cable had only been held in place by the split pin lying between cable and return (after passing round thimble and through ferrule).

We surmise that at some time, rubber washers (apparently home made) had been fitted between the cheeks of the bracket and the oval tube to stop rattle, and the reassembly had been carried out incorrectly with the thimble NOT being placed over the spacer tube. Only the split pin stopped the cable pulling out of the oval tube.
It was impossible to see that the thimble was misplaced, since all of the cable end including the thimble were within the length of the oval tube.

Investigations into who carried out the rubber washer insertion and presumably the misassembly are ongoing.
Steve Naylor IC 857 ME 4/4/99



# Airworthiness Directive 1999-167

**Luftfahrt-Bundesamt**
Airworthiness Directive Section
Hermann-Blenk-Str. 26
38108 Braunschweig
Federal Republic of Germany

## Glaser-Dirks

Effective Date: May 20, 1999

**Affected:**

| | |
|---|---|
| Kind of aeronautical product: | Powered Sailplane |
| Manufacturer: | DG-Flugzeugbau, Bruchsal, Germany |
| Type: | DG-800 A |
| Models affected: | DG-800 B, equipped with Solo engine |
| Serial numbers affected: | see Technical Note |
| German Type Certificate No.: | 873 |

---

**Subject:**
Engine and revision of manual pages.

**Reason:**
Due to the meanwhile available extensive operational experiences the improvements specified in the following must be done.

**Action:**
Exchange of pages into the manual; installation of a) an additional filter for the primer valve, b) a spring to the fuel line near the fuel-filter to prevent kinking the line, c) a rubber mount with high strength inside bush at the connection spindle drive to engine mount and replacement of return spring of the muffler lifting cable by a rubber chord.
To reduce rapid wear of the propeller brake pad a short brake lever with exchangeable pad has been developed. With the modified gear ratio the brake efficiency is slightly reduced, but the durability of the pad is increased.

**Compliance:**
Action must be done during the next 25 hour inspection - but at latest until May, 31.05.1999.

Note: The action No. 7 and No. 8 of the Technical Note ( Replacement of rubber mount and bushes / exchange of propeller brake) is only necessary if required.

**Technical publication of the manufacturer:**
DG-Flugzeugbau Technical Note No. 873/12 dated March 09, 1999 which becomes herewith part of this AD and must be obtained from Messrs.:

DG-Flugzeugbau
P.O. Box 41 20

D-76625 Bruchsal
Federal Republik of Germany

**Accomplishment and log book entry:**
Action to be accomplished by an approved service station and to be checked and entered in the log book by a licensed inspector.

**Holders of affected aircraft registered in Germany have to observe the following:**
As a result of the a.m. deficiencies, the airworthiness of the aircraft is affected to such an extent that after the expiry of the a.m. dates the aircraft may be operated only after proper accomplishment of the prescribed actions. In the interest of aviation safety outweighing the interest of the receiver in a postponement of the prescribed actions, the immediate compliance with this AD is to be directed

**Instructions about Available Legal Remedies:**
An appeal to this notice may be raised within a period of one month following notification. Appeals must be submitted in writing or registered at the Luftfahrt-Bundesamt, Hermann-Blenk-Str. 26, 38108 Braunschweig.

Enquiries regarding this Airworthiness Directive should be referred to Mr. Olaf Schneider, Airworthiness Directive Section at the above address, fax-no. 0049 531/2355-720. Please note, that in case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the German Issue!

WASSAHER
BG1 444

FAULT FOUND ON WA 28F
(ESPADON)

By F.M. JOHNSON 1/C/1134/ME

DRAG PIN ASSY.

HANDLE fitted to PIN BY MEANS of SOFT ALLOY RIVETS

VERY sloppy.

(REMOVE & FIT AN NUT+BOLT)




IF HANDLE COMES AWAY FROM DRAG PIN! WASHER FALLS OFF!. Which then ALLOWS PIN to COME OUT OF the ASSY.

* PLEASE NOTE ALSO WINCH Belly RELEASE fitted. INSPECTED & tested by myself 1/C/1134 ME.

MAX WINCH Speed 65 45 PLACARDED.

TDS 5/6/99

THE GLIDING FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA

**AD 493**
**(ISSUE 1)**

# GFA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

TYPE AFFECTED: IS-28B2, IS-28M2, IS-28M2/80 and IS-30

SUBJECT: Inspection of the airbrake handle for cracks and corrosion. Modification of the airbrake handle.

BACKGROUND: The airbrake handle of an IS-30 (flown solo) broke away after the drive came out of the overcentre lock. The spoilers were sucked fully open leading to an accident as the brakes could not be closed.

DOCUMENTATION: No documentation

ACTION REQUIRED: Before next flight inspect the airbrake handles for cracks as shown in figure 1. Remove any rust for proper inspection. Use a magnifying glass and if in doubt use dye penetrant. If any cracks are found the modification according to figure 2 must be performed prior to the next flight. Otherwise the modification must be performed before the next Form 2 inspection is completed.

The modification must be performed by a certified welder for aircraft. Corrosion is a problem at the handle of the airbrakes. Sweat is very likely to accumulate at the bottom of the handle leading to corrosion and cracks in the affected area. Thorough protection against corrosion after welding is essential for the modification of the airbrake handle.

WEIGHT AND BALANCE: No effect.

IMPLEMENTATION: This inspection must be performed by persons rated for Annual Inspections any type.

COMPLIANCE: The requirements of this GFA Airworthiness Directive are mandatory. This Directive is issued pursuant to the Rules and Regulations of the Gliding Federation of Australia.

SIGNED: _____
CHIEF TECHNICAL OFFICER AIRWORTHINESS

For and on behalf of:
©THE GLIDING FEDERATION OF AUSTRALIA

## Sketch of affected area for closer inspection




## Sketch of modified air brake handle

The sketch is schematic. Particularly the gusset has to be fitted properly into the rounded corner at the handle.

- Gusset from Chromium Molybdenum

  Steel 4130 (t = .060 inch = 1.5 mm)



TNS 5/6/99

SLINGSBY AVIATION



# TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

T.I. No: **110/T65**

**Title: : INSPECTION OF VEGA/SPORTS VEGA FIN MOUNTED TAILPLANE ATTACHMENT BUSH ROPES**

**CLASSIFICATION:** This Service Bulletin has been Classified by SAL as Essential

**COMPLIANCE:** Within 6 months of receipt of this Technical Instruction

**APPLICABILITY:** All T65A, T65D Vega and T65C Sports Vega

**INTRODUCTION:**

There have been cases reported of cracks having been found in the glass ropes which retain the fin mounted tailplane attachment bushes.

These cracks were found during repairs to a glider following a ground loop and could be an indication of further damage to tailplane mounting structure.

This inspection is a one time inspection to all T65 Vega variants.

**ACTION:**

1. If applicable, de-rig tailplane from fin.

2. Clean area of inspection using acetone or equivalent.

3. Using a torch and a magnifying glass, check the structural integrity of the ropes securing rigging bushes to fin, ie there are no cracks in the areas shown on Fig 1. Additionally check the tailplane tang support structure within the fin for delamination etc. Should there be any doubt as to the existence of any cracks then place a bar (bush diameter is 7mm) in each bush in turn and carefully apply a twisting action on the bush, sufficient to disturb any crack that may be there. Ensure force used is not such to damage structure or bush bores.

4. Should the bush ropes be found to be satisfactory and the remaining structure is deemed to be sound, continue as paragraph 6.

5. Should cracks be found in the ropes around the bushes and/or structure is found to be unsound, then please supply to SAL, details of cracking/or other damage, stating whether glider was subject to any recorded ground loop incident, together with glider works number etc.

6. Check tailplane for damage. If any damage found, please supply relevant information to SAL as stated in paragraph 5.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Approved by:<br>For and on behalf of SLINGSBY AVIATION LIMITED | Date: 22/4/99. | Issue 1 |
| Kirkbymoorside, York. YO62 6EZ Tel: 01751 432474<br>Fax No: 01751 431173 E-mail: SAL5@Slingsby co.uk | Page 1 of 3 | |



ISSUED 23 APR 1999

7. Repair any damage prior to next flight, either from information received from manufacturer, ie SAL, or if applicable i.a.w. Vega/GRP Repair Manual.

8. Upon completion of this inspection, and if applicable-repair, annotate logbook "TI 110/T65 complied with" and date.

9. Upon any subsequent ground loop incident, structural integrity of the tailplane mounting structure should be inspected and if in doubt, inspection applied, as stated in paragraph 3 with compliance to the subsequent relevant paragraphs.

For further information or repair schemes please contact SAL Product Support Department.




FIG 1

Issue 8
March 1999

## IAR-SA BRASOV SERIES MOTOR GLIDERS

### PART 1 – IAR-SA BRASOV SERVICE BULLETINS CLASSIFIED AS MANDATORY BY THE ROMANIAN CAA

| *SB No.* | *Description* | *Applicability – Compliance – Requirement* |
|---|---|---|
| IS-28M2/CO-2 | Product improvement. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. Modifications 145, 147, 149, 153, 154, 155, 156, 165 and 167 should have been embodied prior to 1983. |
| IS-28M2/EO-3 | Placard – landing gear lock. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. Modification 198 should have been embodied by 15 March 1979. |
| IS-28M2/CO-4 | Landing gear – down and locked indicator. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. Compliance with Service Bulletin by 30 August 1979. |
| IS-28M2/EO-5 | Maintenance practices and Flight and amendments. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders up to Maintenance Manual Serial No. 33 except Serial Nos 04, 07, 09 and 23. Should have been complied with prior to 1983. |
| IS-28M2/EO-8 | Overhaul life. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. |
| IS-28M2/EO-10 | Flight Controls. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. Compliance required by 1 March 1983. |
| IS-28M2/EO-11 | Replacement of speed limitation placard and amending of the Flight and Maintenance Manuals. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. Compliance required as detailed in Service Bulletin. |
| IS-28M2/EO-12 | Safe and service life increase. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders. Compliance required as detailed in Service Bulletin. |
| IS-28M2/EO-13 | Replacement of rudder bar axle fixing rivet. | Applicable to IS-28M2 and IS-28M2A Serial Nos as detailed in Service Bulletin. Compliance required as detailed in Service Bulletin. |

| *SB No.* | *Description* | *Applicability – Compliance – Requirement* |
|---|---|---|
| IS-28M2/CO-14 | Replacement of Bowden shell support to the left braking cable and mounting of brake pedal stops. | Applicable to all IS-28M2 motor gliders up to Serial No. 66. Compliance required as detailed in Service Bulletin. |

The British Gliding Association Ltd.
Registered No. 422605 England
Registered Office as address

Secretary: Barry Rolfe

Kimberley House, Vaughan Way,
Leicester LE1 4SE
Telephone 0116 2531051
Facsimile 0116 2515939
E-mail Bgahq@aol.com

# British Gliding Association

To: ME7/8 Owners

Date: 1 June 1999

Ref: TNS 5/6/99

SERIOUS DEFECT REPORT – ELEVATOR DRIVE SYSTEM

The elevator lever system at the base of the fin became detached from its support structure, when the pivot bolt pulled through the plywood structure. The cause is almost certainly due to poor manufacturing standards.

Malfunction of the elevator control was detected in the early stages of a winch launch, which was abandoned without injury or damage.

You are strongly recommended to remove the rudder and inspect the elevator drive system for security, before next flight.

**Dick Stratton**
**Chief Technical Officer**

CC: Kenilworth International Limited, PO Box 3223, Dorset, NH31 6FJ
Mike Woollard, Chairman BGA Technical Committee

SLICK MAGNETO COUPLINGS.

**BW 99-04**

**TEXTRON LYCOMING**
**AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE**
**ENGINE**
**SMALL AIRCRAFT AND ROTORCRAFT**

**99-04-04 Textron Lycoming:** Amendment 39-11028. Docket 98-ANE-81-AD.

Applicability: Textron Lycoming O-540-B2B5, B2C5, E4B5, E4C5, G1A5, G2A5, IO-540-K1A5, K1B5, and K1G5 reciprocating model engines equipped with Slick Aircraft Products magneto model numbers 6251, 6252, 6255, 6351 and 6355. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, the following airplanes: Britten Norman BN-2A, -2A-2, -2A-3, -2A-6, -2A-9, -2A-20, -2A-21, -2A-26, -2A-27, -2A-MKIII, -2A-MKIII-2, -2A-MKIII-3, -2B-20, -2B-21, -2B-26, -2B-27 and Piper PA-25-235, PA-25-260, PA-32-260, PA-32-300.

**Note 1:** This airworthiness directive (AD) applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent failure of the magneto impulse coupling, resulting in seizure of the engine, accomplish the following:

(a) For engines on which the service history of the magneto is not known, or on which the magneto has greater than 250 hours TIS since new, factory rebuilt, or overhauled, on the effective date of this AD, within 10 hours of the effective date of this AD, inspect the components of the magneto impulse coupling for the conditions listed in accordance with steps 1 through 7 of the Textron Lycoming Mandatory SB No. 537, dated November 20, 1998.

**Note 2:** The Textron Lycoming Mandatory SB No. 537 dated November 20, 1998 contains the Slick SB No. SB1-98 dated August 26,1998 in its entirety. The steps referenced to the Textron Lycoming SB No. 537 dated November 20, 1998 by this compliance section are the same steps that are contained in the Slick SB No. SB1-98 dated August 26,1998.

(b) For engines on which the magneto has less than or equal to 250 hours TIS since new, factory rebuilt, overhauled on the effective date of this AD, before accumulating 250 hours TIS since new, factory rebuilt or overhauled, or within 10 hours TIS from the effective date of this AD, whichever comes later, inspect the components of the magneto impulse coupling for the conditions listed in accordance with steps 1 through 7 of the Textron Lycoming Mandatory SB No. 537, dated November 20, 1998.

(c) Thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 250 hours TIS since the last inspection performed in accordance with this AD, inspect the components of the magneto impulse coupling for the conditions listed in accordance steps 1 through 7 of the Textron Lycoming Mandatory SB No. 537, dated November 20, 1998.

(d) Remove magneto impulse coupling before 2,000 hours TIS since new and replace with a serviceable part.

(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office.

**Note 3:** Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the New York Aircraft Certification Office.

(f) The inspection shall be done in accordance with the following Textron Lycoming Mandatory SB:

| Document No | Pages | Revision | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| SB No. 537 | 1-9 | Original | November 20, 1998 |

Total pages: 9.

This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Textron Lycoming, 652 Oliver Street, Williamsport, PA 17701. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on February 25, 1999.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Rocco Viselli, Aerospace Engineer, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 10 Fifth Street, 3rd Floor, Valley Stream, NY 11581-1200; telephone (516) 256-7531, fax (516) 568-2716.

## Suggested item for TNS - General matters

**Weighing** - There are some misunderstandings about weighing procedures among even very experienced inspectors, the notes below may help.

On most glass gliders the max cockpit load is limited by the "Max weight of non lifting components", this is the weight of everything except the wings (and water ballast carried in them). The tailplane is part of the non-lifting components. Clearly it is necessary to weigh the wings separately from the rest of the glider to establish this weight. If in any doubt read the manufacturers' manual.

Unless the manufacturer specifies otherwise the max seat load may not exceed 110 Kg (242$^{lb}$). This is limited by seat and strap strength.

After a recent fatal spinning accident the insurance company nearly did not pay up because the pilot was above the max placarded weight. It is normally possible to get a BGA concession to increase max weights, sometimes with suitable reductions in speeds and limitations. Please apply for concessions for heavy pilots so that they may fly legally.

**ASIs** must be able to travel to at least ~~10~~ 5% above VNE. Colour coding as follows is strongly recommended:-

Stall to max rough air -green

Max rough air to VNE - yellow

Above VNE - red

Minimum approach speed - Yellow triangle

Tim Macfadyen 8 April 1999

TNS on altimeters & ASI's

SAFETY REGULATION GROUP

Aviation House
Gatwick Airport South
West Sussex
RH6 0YR

Direct Dial 01293 573150
Direct Fax 01293 573860

Switchboard 01293 567171
Fax 01293 573999
Telex 878753

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

Our ref 9/97/7/5

April 1999

**LETTER TO OWNERS/OPERATORS NO. 1878**
**AEROPLANES & HELICOPTERS (PISTON ENGINED) NOT EXCEEDING 2730 KG MTWA**
**LIGHT AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE (LAMS)**

## 1. Purpose

The purpose of this LTO is to advise light aeroplane and helicopter owners and operators of the re-issue of the Light Aircraft Maintenance Schedule (LAMS).

## 2. Introduction

The CAA has carried out a review of the LAMS Fixed Wing CAA/LAMS/FW/1978 and LAMS Rotary Wing CAA/LAMS/H/1978 both at Issue 2. The review considered the following:

- Age Profile
- Findings from AWN No. 30 CAA Aircraft Survey Programme
- Utilisation
- Maintenance related occurrences
- AAIB Safety recommendations
- Human factor principles required by ICAO Annex 6
- Representations from aircraft owners, operators and maintenance personnel

The review resulted in the following revisions:

- Removal of applicability for turbine engined aeroplanes and helicopters
- Aircraft classified under commercial air transport and non-commercial air transport
- Acceptable as part of a JAR-OPS approved maintenance programme
- Introduction of a 50 hour/6 month check for all aircraft categories
- Removal of Section 9 listing of Placards and Notice Requirements
- Removal of Sections 10 and 11 listing of Mandatory Requirements, Supplementary Inspections and Servicing
- Schedule task pages reproduced in 'worksheet' format
- Introduction of general inspection standards and practices recommended by the organisation responsible for the type design
- Introduction of human factor principles throughout
- Available in both A4 and A5 size

3. **Grant of Approval**

The CAA has approved, by the issue of Airworthiness Notice No. 63, the following light aircraft maintenance schedules:

CAA/LAMS/A/1999 Issue 1 in relation to piston engined aeroplanes not exceeding 2730 kg Maximum Total Weight Authorised, and CAA/LAMS/H/1999 Issue 1 in relation to piston engined helicopters not exceeding 2730 kg Maximum Total Weight Authorised.

This approval shall come into force on 1 June 1999.

4. **Revocation of Approval**

The CAA has varied the approval granted, by the issue of Airworthiness Notice No. 63, in respect of LAMS CAA/LAMS/FW/1978 Issue 2 and LAMS CAA/LAMS/H/1978 Issue 2 (the Approved Schedules) by adding the following conditions:

The Approved Schedules shall not be used for the scheduled maintenance of any piston engined aircraft in respect of its next annual check on or following 1 June 1999 or thereafter.

The Approved Schedules shall not be used for the scheduled maintenance of any turbine engined aircraft in respect of its next annual check coincident with a star inspection on or following 1 June 1999 or thereafter.

The CAA, has revoked the Approval of the Approved Schedules CAA/LAMS/FW/1978 Issue 2 and CAA/LAMS/H/1978 Issue 2 with effect from 1 June 2002.

5. **Additional Information**

Additional copies of the re-issued LAMS in A4 and A5 size may be purchased from Westward Digital Limited, 37 Windsor Street, Cheltenham, Glos. GL52 2DG, Tel: 01242 235151.

Enquiries regarding this LTO should be referred to your local CAA SRG Regional Office as shown below:

| | |
|---|---|
| AMSD Aberdeen | 01224 724684 |
| AMSD Gatwick | 01293 823993 |
| AMSD Heathrow | 0181 759 0205 |
| AMSD Irvine | 01294 312292 |
| AMSD Luton | 01582 410304 |
| AMSD North East & Midlands | 01332 811245 |
| AMSD Manchester | 0161 499 3055 |
| AMSD Stansted | 01279 466747 |
| AMSD Weston Super Mare | 01934 522260 |

W J DONE
**Head of Maintenance Requirements and Policy Section**